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Abstract
The assurance technique is a fundamental component of the assurance ecosystem; it is the mechanism by which we assess
security to derive a measure of assurance. Despite this importance, the characteristics of these assurance techniques
have not been comprehensively explored within academic research from the perspective of industry stakeholders. Here,
a framework of 20 “assurance techniques” is defined along with their interdependencies. A survey was conducted which
received 153 responses from industry stakeholders, in order to determine perceptions of the characteristics of these
assurance techniques. These characteristics include the expertise required, number of people required, time required for
completion, effectiveness and cost. The extent to which perceptions differ between those in practitioner and management
roles is considered. The findings were then used to compute a measure of cost-effectiveness for each assurance technique.
Survey respondents were also asked about their perceptions of complementary assurance techniques. These findings were
used to establish 15 combinations, of which the combined effectiveness and cost-effectiveness was assessed.
Keywords: Security, Assurance Techniques, Perceptions, Security Assessment
1. Introduction
At the heart of the information assurance process lie
the “assurance techniques” that are used to evaluate and
measure security. Despite this, and against the backdrop
of the trend of year-on-year annual increases of security
expenditures for organisations of all sizes [1, 2], the charac-
teristics of assurance techniques remain largely unstudied.
This leaves a lingering question unanswered: how do we
ensure that the increasing number of trained professionals,
products, and services in the information assurance space
are deployed and utilised in a cost-effective manner? The
necessity of such knowledge increases through the growing
number of certifications and legal regulations for organisa-
tions of all sizes that mandate a “level” of assurance that
must be met.
This study intends to address this gap through a large-
scale study on the perceptions of industry practitioners
on the value of such assurance techniques. This work
is intended to facilitate the economic use and procure-
ment of assurance techniques by entities seeking to evalu-
ate their security posture, inform the design of future as-
surance schemes which mandate particular assurance tech-
niques, and provide a resource for academic research on
cost-effective approaches to assessing security. The key
contributions of this paper are:
1. A consistent and coherent assurance terminology to
clearly define assurance schemes, targets, techniques,
and evidence along with their relationships.
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2. The definition of an assurance technique framework
consisting of 20 assurance techniques classified across
5 categories, along with the relationships between
them.
3. An analysis of the perceptions of 153 industry prac-
titioners about the characteristics (e.g., the effective-
ness) of the assurance techniques defined within the
framework, both as individual entities and as combi-
nations, along with how perceptions differ between
practitioner and managerial roles.
4. The synthesis of perceptions to derive measures of
assurance technique cost-effectiveness.
The remainder of this publication is organised as fol-
lows. Related literature is introduced in Section 2. Sec-
tion 3 describes the methodology used within this study.
Terminology for the assurance ecosystem is then defined
in Section 4, along with the framework of 20 assurance
techniques across 5 categories in Section 5. Data on the
survey and composition of respondents is presented in Sec-
tion 6. Section 7.2 then examines the perceptions for in-
dividual assurance technique characteristics. A metric for
cost-effectiveness is introduced in Section 7.3 along with
the results of the analysis. Combinations of assurance
techniques are then established, and analysed for their ef-
fectiveness and cost-effectiveness in Section 7.4. Section 8
concludes the paper.
2. Related Work
Despite the extensive body of research for information
assurance, the techniques with which we measure security
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have largely escaped rigorous analysis. Two dimensions
of existing literature are explored below: the effectiveness
of assurance techniques themselves and the economics of
effectiveness.
The discussion of assurance techniques within existing
literature has largely fallen on their role within software
assurance. In particular, assurance techniques and their
use within the Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC)
(e.g., [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]), or in rare cases, their use within
specific product-focused assurance schemes (e.g., the clas-
sification of assurance techniques for use within Common
Criteria [8]). The predominant body of work in this area
has been instigated by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) project, Software Assurance Met-
rics And Tool Evaluation (SAMATE1), which is sponsored
by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). An
abundance of publications have been produced under this
umbrella2; in particular around the topic of source code
analysis, with the predominant focus on static analysis
(e.g., [9, 10]). SAMATE also performs comparative anal-
yses of static analysis tools as part of its Static Anal-
ysis Tool Exposition (SATE) project. The fourth iter-
ation is published as NIST Special Publication 500-279
[11]. Beyond SAMATE, static analysis is notable for re-
ceiving wider interest as a topic of academic security re-
search (e.g., [12, 13]), along with its counterpart, dynamic
analysis (e.g., [14]). More broadly, a comprehensive re-
view of existing software security assessment tools is pre-
sented in [15], focusing on when they can be used, their
required skills, and their benefits and drawbacks. One as-
surance technique that has seen research that includes but
spans beyond software assurance, is that of penetration
testing (which is also frequently used as a misnomer to
describe other assurance techniques, such as vulnerability
assessments). Little of this research has looked at mea-
suring the effectiveness of penetration testing; however,
the core themes have centred on its potential effectiveness
to organisations and the motivations for procuring them
(e.g., [16, 17, 18]), ensuring those who conduct penetration
tests are appropriately skilled which has a direct relation-
ship with the resulting effectiveness (e.g., [19, 20]), and
the methodologies for conducting a successful penetration
test (e.g., [21]).
The cost-effectiveness of assurance technique usage is
one component within the larger domain of research sur-
rounding the economics of information assurance. Although
a marked increase in research activity has been seen here
over the past five years (see [22] for an early survey), the
emphasis has predominantly fallen on topics such as incen-
tives (e.g., [23]), the related topic of cyber insurance (e.g.,
[24]), and cyber crime (e.g., [25, 26]), while limited atten-
tion has been paid to the economic aspects of assurance
techniques – in particular, their cost-effectiveness. Where
1http://samate.nist.gov/Main_Page.html
2A comprehensive list of SAMATE publications can be found at:
http://samate.nist.gov/index.php/SAMATE_Publications.html
this exists, the focus has again fallen on software assur-
ance. For instance, [27] investigated the economic impact
of inadequate infrastructure for software testing and [28]
elaborated on existing approaches to model and assess the
cost and value of software.
The scope of assurance techniques falls beyond soft-
ware assurance, however, and it is in this broader ap-
plication that this study is concerned: the multitude of
assurance techniques, both non-technical (e.g., interviews
and observation) and technical (e.g., penetration tests),
which can be used in the assessment of security controls
(be they technical, organisational or physical). To the au-
thors’ knowledge, existing literature has not yet covered




















































This study presents the first comprehensive study of
the characteristics of assurance techniques from the per-
spective of industry stakeholders. The methodology is il-
lustrated in Figure 1. It can be seen to span two phases,
with information gathered from three sources: First, desk
research examined existing literature and the definition
and usage of assurance techniques within 17 assurance
schemes (e.g., within standards). Second, 14 targeted in-
terviews (i.e., for particular assurance schemes or scenar-
ios) to understand the role of assurance techniques in prac-
tice. Third, an online survey that received responses from
153 industry stakeholders.
This study’s first phase defined an assurance technique
framework to ensure the consistent and reliable data col-
lection during phase two. Through the desk research the
components involved in conducting assurance activities in
practice were dissected, and re-constructed here in the
form of a terminology model of the assurance ecosystem.
Desk research was then further combined with the experi-
ences and clarifications of subject matter experts that were
gained through interviews, in order to establish a consol-
idated but comprehensive set of assurance technique defi-
nitions and their classifications. The outputs of phase one
can be found in Section 4 and Section 5.
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The second phase involved a stakeholder-supported anal-
ysis of this framework. This was primarily achieved through
the gathering of perceptions about assurance technique
characteristics from 153 stakeholders through an online
survey, and their subsequent analysis. Although caution
must be pursued in interpreting the subjective construct
of perception, it is pursued here with the intent of pro-
viding insight into a key group of individuals within the
information assurance process: those charged with using
and procuring assurance techniques as part of their day-
to-day roles. Prior to the public release of the survey a
three stakeholder pilot study was conducted; the feedback
from this process (provided either through email or in-
person) allowed the clarification and refinement of ques-
tions that were perceived as unclear or misleading. The as-
surance technique definitions were provided to stakehold-
ers during the survey to facilitate consistency of under-
standing. The primary output of the survey was the collec-
tion of perceptions about five characteristics of assurance
techniques (number of people required, time taken, exper-
tise required, cost, and effectiveness), along with percep-
tions about which assurance techniques are complimentary
when pursuing cost-effective approaches to security assess-
ments. This data is presented and analysed here; this anal-
ysis further considered the extent to which perceptions dif-
fer between practitioner and management roles, with the
intention of providing insights into the drivers and barriers
for decision making regarding information assurance. The
perceptions of cost and effectiveness were then aggregated
into a measure of cost-effectiveness at both an individual
and group level (based on perceptions of complementar-
ity). This analysis enabled further analyses of assurance
technique use in practice within assurance schemes 3. The
outputs of phase two can be found in Section 6 and Sec-
tion 7.
4. Terminology
The use of consistent terminology aids comprehension
of meaning and facilitates the process of collecting reli-
able data within the study. However, this study detected,
through a review of related literature and publicly avail-
able information about assurance schemes, that there were
inconsistencies and incoherences in the names and ways as-
surance techniques are referred to between sources. There-
fore, the first contribution of this study is a terminology to
describe four basic components of assurance. Each compo-
nent is described below, and their relationships collectively
illustrated in Figure 2.
Assurance Scheme. This encompasses both stan-
dards (e.g., ISO/IEC 27001) and qualifications (e.g., CISSP).
For both, at least one assurance target is set. In some
assurance schemes, there are explicitly defined assurance
3The results of this output can be found in [29].
techniques that should be used to assess targets (repre-
sented in Figure 2 as a dashed line). For others, these
are set and enforced through an external body (e.g., an
accreditation body).
Assurance Target. An assurance target may be ei-
ther a security control (e.g., asset management) or the
competence requirements to assess such security controls
(e.g., an individual must possess a certain qualification).
Assurance Technique (also known as an Assurance
Activity). A method of assessing an assurance target.
There are two types of assurance techniques. Those which
assess security controls (e.g., penetration testing) and those
that assess the competence requirements for using those
assurance techniques (e.g., a multiple choice or lab-based
exam).
Audit and Assessment Evidence. The use of an
assurance technique to assess an assurance target gener-
ates audit or assessment evidence. Such evidence is used
to assess compliance to an assurance scheme. This com-
ponent is produced through the interaction of the three
aforementioned components, and can be seen as the com-
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Figure 2: The Assurance Ecosystem
5. Assurance Techniques
Potential variations of assurance techniques are abun-
dant. Therefore, the definition of a consolidated set of as-
surance techniques is paramount to allow for consistency
within the survey and ensuing analysis. This study defines
20 high-level assurance techniques, which are split over 5
categories. Four of these categories represent the broad
techniques for assessing assurance targets, in the tradi-
tional sense of a security control: Review; Interview; Ob-
serve and Test. This is supplemented by a fifth category,
Independent Validation, which represents third-party as-
sessment. As highlighted in Section 4 assurance techniques
can also exist to assess individual competency for using
other assurance techniques. For this a further category
3
and 5 assurance techniques were defined, but will not be
discussed here; the focus instead, being placed on assur-
ance techniques to assess security controls4.
The following set of assurance techniques must be dis-
tinguished from two meta-techniques.
The first of these is the audit, which is more appropri-
ately defined as a process in which other assurance tech-
niques are used to determine conformance to a specifica-
tion. Assurance techniques in this context generate audit
evidence. Such assurance techniques may be used directly
by auditors (i.e., one or more individuals conducting an
audit), although equally, an auditee (i.e., the client un-
dergoing the audit) may also use assurance techniques, or
procure services that use them (e.g., penetration tests), for
which the audit evidence may be used by an auditor.
The second is risk assessment, which can be reduced
to five consolidated steps [30]: asset identification; threat
assessment; vulnerability assessment; risk evaluation (i.e.,
computing a measure of “risk”); and the recommendation
of countermeasures. The assurance techniques that we
have defined here are predominantly concerned with that
of vulnerability assessment, although some assurance tech-
niques contribute in full or part to the two prior steps (e.g.,
asset identification is a fundamental step of architectural
reviews of operational systems, while threat assessment is
explicitly defined here). The appropriate choice of assur-
ance techniques here is paramount, as it is the outputs of
these techniques that provide the variables for risk com-
putation, which ultimately influences choices surrounding
risk treatment (e.g., the implementation of new security
controls). This importance for appropriate assurance tech-
nique choice can be extended when examining their role in
risk management, which goes beyond the scope of a single
risk assessment through monitoring and reviewing organ-
isational risk over time. Controls may be implemented
as part of the risk assessment process; the level of risk,
pre and post-treatment, will then influence the choice of
assurance techniques that are used within subsequent it-
erations of risk assessments. Therefore, inappropriate as-
surance techniques use can have an impact on the wider
risk management process.
The definition of the 20 high-level assurance techniques
organised in 5 categories is provided below. Figure 3 vi-
sualises assurance technique categorisation and relation-
ships.
5.1. Review
Review of Documented Policies, Procedures, and
Processes - The process of analysing the documented
specifications (e.g., procedures and security properties) and
processes (e.g., managerial) for a component or system un-
der assessment.
4The definition of competency assessing assurance techniques and
their relationships to those defined here can be found in [29]
Review of Client-Completed Self-Assessment Form
- An analysis of a client submitted review of their imple-
mentation of assurance targets as set out within an assur-
ance scheme. Self-assessment forms typically consist of a
multitude of questions that a client must answer is multi-
ple choice or narrative form.
Threat Assessment - A multi-stage process used to
identify and rank the threats to computer software, a com-
ponent, or IT system. Threat analysis builds upon the
analysis of sub-processes such as asset identification and
architectural reviews against a security policy.
Architectural Review - An analysis of the compo-
nents (type, quantity, configuration, etc.) and their rela-
tionships within a piece of software, component, or system
to determine if their implementation meets a desired secu-
rity policy.
Configuration Review - A review of the way a sys-
tem or its software has been configured to see if this leads
to known vulnerabilities. Configuration reviews can be
passive (e.g., manually checking software versions for known
vulnerabilities) or active (e.g., automated build review scan-
ners).
Source Code Review - The examination of source
code to discover faults that were introduced during the
software development process. Source code reviews are
predominantly manual; however, they may be supplemented
with automated techniques (e.g., using static analysis tools).
5.2. Observe
Observe - The process of watching a live, operational
system to identify real-world deviations from documented
assurance targets.
5.3. Interview
Interview - The process of questioning one or more
individuals about security-related matters within the or-
ganisation being assessed through any medium (e.g., in
person or virtually).
5.4. Test
Vulnerability Scan - The process of using an auto-
mated scanner on a web application or network to iden-
tify vulnerabilities. Discovered vulnerabilities are not ex-
ploited.
Penetration Test - A simulated attack on a com-
ponent or system using similar techniques to that of a
real-world malicious attacker. A penetration test may
build upon a vulnerability assessment; however, it differs
in having an implicit or explicit goal that the assessment
attempts to realise (e.g., compromise sensitive data or ob-
tain a certain level of network access). Typically this re-
quires vulnerabilities to be exploited, which would not be
undertaken within a vulnerability assessment.
Red Team Exercise - A simulated attack on a system
that is given more freedom than is available during a pen-
etration test, in order to more realistically simulate a real-
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Figure 3: Assurance Techniques
of the engagement’s duration (e.g., often months in dura-
tion), available human resources (e.g., large teams built
around individuals with different specialisms), allowed use
of tools (e.g., a heavy use of social engineering is com-
mon), and restriction of defender knowledge to test their
day-to-day responses to cyber threats.
Social Engineering - An attempt to manipulate one
or more human users into performing an action that does
not conform to operational procedures. This can be con-
ducted in a manner that is goal-based (e.g., access data)
or audit-based (e.g., the percentage of a department vul-
nerable to a phishing attack).
Static Analysis - Without executing computer soft-
ware, static analysis attempts to debug and identify po-
tential software vulnerabilities through an analysis of its
source code. Static analyses are predominantly automated;
however, they may contain some elements of manual in-
teraction (e.g., in order to understand the context and im-
plications of the results). Human-led analyses fall under
source code review.
Dynamic Analysis - Once computer software has
been executed, this technique attempts to debug and iden-
tify potential software vulnerabilities through active meth-
ods (e.g., inputting unexpected data through fuzzing) and
passive methods (e.g., memory analysis).
Fuzzing - The process of injecting erroneous and un-
expected data into an input field in order to trigger faults
(e.g., crashes and exceptions) that could be leveraged to
discover software vulnerabilities. Fuzzing may be dumb
(i.e., random) or intelligent (i.e., with a knowledge of the
protocol being tested).
Formal Verification - The use of mathematical tech-
niques for assessing functional properties of information
and communication systems.
Cryptographic Validation - A method used to anal-
yse a cryptographic algorithm and/or its implementation
within a component or system (e.g., entropy testing).
Emanation Security Analysis - One or more meth-
ods used to assess device emanations (e.g., electromagnetic
or sound emanations) for the unintentional leakage and
disclosure of information.
5.5. Independent Validation
Independent validation occurs when a third party is
used to verify the assessment methodology of an assur-
ance technique, or otherwise validate the results of its as-
sessment of assurance targets.
Witnessed Test - The use of an independent witness
to provide a second level of verification that the results of
an assurance technique are as described.
Public Review - The process of opening a technol-
ogy, component, or system to wider review by the public.
Public reviews may be of documents (e.g., drafts of fu-




Expert knowledge was gathered from 153 security prac-
titioners who responded to the survey. Through this we
sought to understand: First, the requirements to con-
duct each assurance technique, including the expertise re-
quired, the number of people required, and the time re-
quired; Second, the cost of conducting each assurance tech-
nique; Third, the effectiveness of each assurance technique;
Fourth, which assurance techniques are complementary
when pursuing cost-effective security assessments. Such
variables are dynamic and change according to the assur-
ance target under assessment. Notably, with regard to
the size and nature of the target organisation, and the
environment and terms of evaluation. In order to enable
meaningful comparisons across assurance techniques and
to maximise the fairness of any such comparison, survey re-
spondents were suggested to consider a medium-size com-
mercial scenario when providing their perceptions of assur-
ance techniques. The scenario presented to respondents
was defined as follows:
“For each assurance technique, assume a commercial
target of medium size. Examples: company with 250 em-
ployees; infrastructure with 16 external IPs or 150 internal
IPs; web application with one database and 100 static or
dynamic pages; product like a Firewall, Router or Switch.”
The definitions of assurance techniques presented within
Section 5 were also provided to stakeholders to encourage
consistency in interpretation and understanding between
stakeholders. The composition of stakeholders who re-
sponded to the survey are presented in Section 6.1, and
the findings in Section 7. In both cases, where percent-















Security Practitioner (e.g., a
penetration tester, security
architect)
Figure 4: Primary Role of Survey Participants
Primary Role: The distribution of the day-to-day roles
of the survey respondents can be seen in Figure 4. The
focus of questioning was placed on primary roles; how-
ever, some stakeholders deemed their day-to-day roles to
span multiple roles defined within this paper, and were re-
ported here as such. The majority of respondents reported
being security practitioners (124; 67%), which is advan-
tageous for this research activity as such individuals are
those who utilise assurance techniques on a frequent basis.
Such reasoning applies further to the auditor role (17; 9%);
as described in Section 5, auditing is a meta-technique in-
volving assurance technique usage and evaluation. With
the exception of competence assessors (5; 3%), the two
remaining roles are managerial: Chief Information Secu-
rity Officer (5; 3%) and Information Security Manager (33;
18%). While individuals in these roles may not utilise as-
surance techniques on a day-to-day basis, their perceptions
do drive wider organisational security programmes.
Industry Experience: The distribution of the number of
years the respondents have spent in the security industry is
shown in Figure 5. Notably, 45% respondents have spent













Figure 5: Years Spent in the Security Industry
Assurance Schemes: The assurance schemes that re-
spondents reported to be involved in are shown in Figure






















Figure 6: Involvement in Assurance Schemes
First, those where assessment provides a certification
for managing security risks. The three most frequent schemes
fell into this category. The de facto Information Security
Management System (ISMS) standard, ISO/IEC 27001,
featured most predominantly with 113 respondents. Cy-
ber Essentials, a UK-specific, entry-level certification was
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also widely represented (86). The Payment Card Industry
Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) for those who process
credit cards placed third (49). CESG, the information se-
curity arm of GCHQ, operates two schemes here. CESG
Assured Service (CAS) (25) assesses a multitude of services
with industry-specific implementations such as CAS-T for
telecommunications. The CESG Pan Government Accred-
itation (PGA) (25) scheme was designed to manage com-
bined risks within the UK public sector.
Second, those for assessing the security of products.
This includes ISO/IEC 15408 (Common Criteria) (30),
which plays a further role within the CESG scheme, Com-
mercial Product Assurance (CPA) (24). Furthermore, the
CESG Tailored Assurance Service (CTAS) (24) is intended
to provide answers to specific assurance concerns during
the accreditation process.
Third, those proving organisational competency to de-
liver security assessments. CHECK (43) is a mandatory
certification for organisations delivering IT Health Checks
(a form of penetration test) to UK public sector bodies.
CREST (47) is the predominant (optional) alternative for
organisations delivering penetration tests and related ser-
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Figure 7: Individual Qualifications Held
Individual Qualifications: The frequency of industry qual-
ifications held by respondents is shown in Figure 7. The
total qualification frequency exceeds the respondent count,
as respondents were encouraged to list all qualifications
held.
Both of the highest frequency schemes are broad in
scope and related in design. The CESG Certified Profes-
sional (CCP) (81) scheme defines seven roles that candi-
dates can be assessed against. The most popular, however,
was the CESG Listed Advisor Scheme (CLAS) (86) which
provides additional assurance about individuals through
its assessment requiring CCP and security clearance. The
respondent discrepancy is understood to be the result of
some respondents only listing the “higher” CLAS qualifi-
cation.
The (ISC)2 Certified Information Systems Security Pro-
fessional (CISSP) (59) qualification assesses broad domains
of security knowledge, and is targeted at managerial roles.
A further managerial qualification, although appearing less
frequently is the ISACA Certified Information Security
Manager (CISM) (12). CISM has been positioned within
the market between CISSP and the audit-specific ISACA
qualification, Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA)
(11). Auditing qualifications for ISO/IEC 27001 come in
a variety of forms (e.g., Lead or Internal Auditor). The
high frequency of appearance (55) is not surprising given
the high frequency of assurance scheme involvement (see
Figure 6). Both ISO/IEC 27001 and PCI DSS (8) show
less frequency within qualifications to assurance scheme
involvement due to differing individual and organisational
competency requirements within the schemes. For exam-
ple, for PCI DSS, for auditing, both the organisation and
individual must achieve Qualified Security Assessor (QSA)
status; for vulnerability scans only the organisation must
be an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV); for penetration
testing there are no requirements, only guidelines [31].
The remaining qualifications target the penetration test-
ing industry. EC-Council’s Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH)
(11) is an entry-level qualification. The CHECK Team
Member (22) and CHECK Team Leader (10) are both
CESG qualifications. Similar to CLAS, the CHECK qual-
ifications require a pre-requisite qualification plus security
clearance. In this case, these pre-requisites are based on a
mapping to industry “equivalent” qualifications by three
providers: CREST, Tigerscheme, Cyber Scheme. A tabu-
lar mapping can be found in [32].
7. Results
The emphasis of the following analyses fall on repre-
senting the perceptions of the cyber security industry from
an holistic perspective. However, given the specialisms in-
herent within the industry, it is reasonable to suspect that
these perceptions may differ between role groups. To eval-
uate such a hypothesis, independent sample t-tests were
also conducted to compare the perceptions of those from
Security Practitioner and Information Security Manager
roles. This role-based analysis was restricted to the two
highest frequency roles, due to the remaining containing
inadequate frequencies for a representative statistical anal-
ysis. As highlighted in Section 6.1 some stakeholders re-
ported multiple day-to-day roles as part of this study. Such
is the case here, with 15 stakeholders holding a day-to-day
role as both a Security Practitioner (out of 124) and Infor-
mation Security Manager (33). This caveat must be con-
sidered in the interpretation of results. The t-tests were
conducted for each of the 20 assurance techniques, in both
the evaluation of respondent confidence in Section 7.1, and
the five characteristics under evaluation in Section 7.2. In
order to conduct such an evaluation, the qualitative labels
to describe perceptions of assurance technique character-
istics had to be converted to a quantitative form. A linear
mapping between the incrementing qualitative label (e.g.,
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of skill level or time required) and an incrementing numer-
ical value (i.e., 1,2,. . . n) was used for this purpose. For the
sake of brevity, it will only be reported where there is a sta-
tistically significant difference (p<0.05) in the perceptions
between roles.
7.1. Stakeholder Confidence
Table 1: Confidence of Respondents About Input
Assurance Technique Confidence Level Total
Low Med High Resp.
Review of [...] PPP 3% 39% 58% 93
[...] Self Assessment Form 17% 45% 38% 84
Architectural Review 1% 36% 63% 83
Configuration Review 4% 51% 46% 79
Source Code Review 17% 43% 39% 69
Observation 11% 55% 34% 56
Interview 8% 38% 54% 71
Red Team Exercises 6% 42% 52% 66
Penetration Tests 5% 30% 66% 88
Vulnerability Scan 6% 36% 58% 85
Social Engineering 17% 38% 45% 65
Threat Assessment 3% 47% 51% 73
Static Analysis 27% 61% 11% 44
Dynamic Analysis 26% 57% 17% 42
Fuzzing 29% 49% 22% 41
Formal Verification 15% 55% 30% 40
Cryptographic Validation 20% 46% 34% 41
Emanation Security Analysis 34% 51% 14% 35
Witnessed Test 10% 63% 28% 40
Public Review 37% 47% 16% 38
Confidence Level: Respondents were asked to provide
a measure of confidence about their answers for each as-
surance techniques, on a scale of “Low”, “Medium” and
“High”. Table 1 displays the results. Bolded figures rep-
resent the category with the highest frequency for each
assurance technique. Notable within these findings is a
clear trend of decreasing confidence as total respondent
frequency decreases. This trend continues throughout the
survey data.
Assurance techniques with the highest proportion of
“High” confidence answers were found to be Penetration
Testing (66%) and Architectural Reviews (63%). The high-
est proportion of “Low” answers were Public Review and
Emanation Security Analysis, with a combined “Low” and
“Medium” total of 84% and 85% respectively. Potential
reasons for the low confidence trend may be the result of
some assurance techniques only having specific use cases
(e.g., Emanation Security Analysis and high security en-
vironments) or their relative novelty (e.g., Public Review
and bug bounties).
No assurance techniques were found to have a sta-
tistically significant difference (p<0.05) in perceptions of
expertise requirements between the Security Practitioner
and Information Security Manager roles.
7.2. Assurance Technique Characteristics
Number of People Required: For the reference scenario
used within this study, Table 2 shows that at least 75% of
respondents perceived that 19 of the assurance techniques
could be completed by one or two people. For successful
completion by one person, Vulnerability Scans and the Re-
view of Client-Completed Self-Assessment Forms are par-
ticularly notable, having received 84% and 81% respec-
tively. Furthermore, Architectural Reviews, Threat As-
sessment, and Static Analysis each received figures greater
than 70%. Of the perceptions for completion by two peo-
ple, Penetration Testing received 59%; this may be a result
of the specialism that characterises the profession (e.g.,
web applications and infrastructure). One marked excep-
tion is that of Red Team Exercises for which 58% of re-
spondents perceived that it required three or more people,
and 35% perceiving a requirement of four or more. This
may once again be the consequence of specialism, given
the strong relationship between Red Team Exercises and
Penetration Testing and Social Engineering (see Figure 3).
Table 2: Number of People Required
Assurance Technique Number of People Total
1 2 3 4+ Resp.
Review of [...] PPP 54% 38% 6% 1% 94
[...] Self Assessment Form 81% 13% 4% 2% 84
Architectural Review 70% 20% 6% 4% 83
Configuration Review 63% 28% 5% 4% 82
Source Code Review 49% 29% 12% 10% 69
Observation 64% 30% 4% 2% 56
Interview 44% 48% 8% - 71
Red Team Exercises 10% 31% 25% 33% 67
Penetration Tests 28% 59% 11% 1% 88
Vulnerability Scan 84% 14% 2% - 86
Social Engineering 42% 45% 5% 9% 65
Threat Assessment 73% 21% 4% 3% 73
Static Analysis 75% 18% 5% 2% 44
Dynamic Analysis 69% 19% 7% 5% 42
Fuzzing 78% 17% - 5% 41
Formal Verification 40% 38% 10% 13% 40
Cryptographic Validation 56% 29% 7% 7% 41
Emanation Security Analysis 60% 34% 6% - 35
Witnessed Test 55% 33% 13% - 40
Public Review 49% 27% 5% 19% 37
A significant difference was identified for Witnessed
Test in the perceptions of Security Practitioners (M=1.48,
SD=0.71, N=33) and Information Security Managers (M=2,
SD=0.53, N=8); t(14) = -2.28, p = 0.039, two tailed. This
difference may be a consequence of the lack Security Prac-
titioner familiarity with Witnessed Test usage, which is
largely constrained to the compliance assessment process
(e.g., for standards and regulations). In this case, percep-
tions of Information Security Managers may have greater
accuracy due to their potential oversight and involvement
in such a process, which leads to a greater awareness of
the parties involved.
Expertise Required: A cyber security skills gap is a fre-
quently cited issue facing the industry. However, assur-
ance techniques must continue to be appropriately skilled;
therefore, to understand job role requirements, respon-
dents were asked what they perceive to be the required
consultant role to successfully complete each assurance
technique. Results are shown in Table 3.
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Table 3: Expertise Required — P: Practitioner (also known as Ju-
nior); P(W): Practitioner with Supervision; S: Senior; Pr: Principal.
Assurance Technique Expertise Required Total
P P(W) S Pr Resp.
Review of [...] PPP 33% 35% 32% - 94
[...] Self Assessment Form 48% 29% 23% 1% 84
Architectural Review 8% 12% 71% 8% 83
Configuration Review 23% 44% 33% - 82
Source Code Review 14% 25% 46% 14% 69
Observation 30% 41% 25% 4% 56
Interview 13% 19% 58% 10% 72
Red Team Exercises 9% 14% 55% 23% 66
Penetration Tests 14% 36% 45% 5% 88
Vulnerability Scan 50% 36% 14% - 86
Social Engineering 20% 32% 45% 3% 65
Threat Assessment 5% 22% 59% 14% 73
Static Analysis 27% 32% 41% - 44
Dynamic Analysis 17% 36% 48% - 42
Fuzzing 29% 34% 34% 2% 41
Formal Verification 13% 25% 48% 15% 40
Cryptographic Validation 7% 12% 59% 22% 41
Emanation Security Analysis 9% 46% 34% 11% 35
Witnessed Test 18% 30% 50% 3% 40
Public Review 38% 27% 24% 11% 37
The findings suggest that many assurance techniques
require Senior consultants. Notable within this category
are Architectural Review, Interview, Red Team Exercises,
Threat Assessment and Cryptographic Validation. Of these,
Architectural Review ranked the highest with a 71% Senior
requirement. Few assurance techniques were perceived to
require Principal consultants, although both Red Team
Exercises (23%) and Cryptographic Validation (22%) are
prominent within this role. Each also contained distinctly
high perceptions of a minimum Senior requirement, giving
a combined total for Senior and Principal as 78% and 81%
respectively.
If provided with supervision, some assurance techniques
were perceived as adequate to be performed by the Prac-
titioner role. Configuration Review and Emanation Secu-
rity Analysis can both be seen to have marked increases
in this scenario, compared to when to supervision is not
provided. This has implications for its cost-effectiveness
as it constitutes time from two roles. For Practitioners
without supervision, the dominant assurance techniques
were Review of Client-Completed Self-Assessment Forms,
Vulnerability Scan, and Public Review.
No assurance techniques were found to have a statis-
tically significant difference (p<0.05) in confidence levels
between the Security Practitioner and Information Secu-
rity Manager roles.
Time Required: Perceptions of the duration required
to complete each assurance technique for the given refer-
ence scenario can be found in Table 4. The majority of
assurance techniques can be completed within 10 days ac-
cording to the perceptions of respondents, with the highest
frequencies largely falling within the 2-10 day range. Of
those in the range of two days or less, once again Review of
Client-Completed Self-Assessment Forms and Vulnerabil-
ity Scans are prominent in comparison to other assurance
techniques. Both received 79% of their respondents for
two days or less, and 52% and 39% respectively for one
day or less.
It is noteworthy that a sizeable fraction of respondents
perceived some assurance techniques to require greater
than 10 days to complete: Source Code Review (44%),
Cryptographic Validation (32%) and Red Team Exercise
(29%). Perceptions of Public Review also totalled 35% in
this category; this may be because certain schemes which
use this assurance technique are often not goal-specific, in-
stead running for long periods of time and soliciting wider
contributions (e.g., bug bounties).
No assurance techniques were found to have a statisti-
Table 4: Time Required to Complete
Assurance Technique Time Required to Complete Total
<1 1 2 2-10 10-20 20+ Resp.
Day Day Days Days Days Days
Review of [...] PPP 2% 8% 16% 55% 15% 4% 93
[...] Self Assessment Form 21% 31% 27% 17% 4% - 84
Architectural Review 4% 14% 23% 43% 13% 2% 83
Configuration Review 11% 14% 21% 40% 14% 1% 81
Source Code Review 1% 4% 9% 42% 25% 19% 69
Observation 4% 14% 38% 41% 2% 2% 56
Interview 14% 18% 32% 31% 6% - 72
Red Team Exercises - 9% 21% 41% 21% 8% 66
Penetration Tests 1% 1% 14% 66% 17% 1% 88
Vulnerability Scan 15% 24% 40% 19% 2% - 86
Social Engineering 6% 14% 29% 45% 3% 3% 65
Threat Assessment - 22% 27% 36% 12% 3% 73
Static Analysis 2% 11% 43% 30% 7% 7% 44
Dynamic Analysis - 17% 36% 36% 7% 5% 42
Fuzzing - 24% 37% 27% 10% 2% 41
Formal Verification 3% 10% 13% 53% 8% 15% 40
Cryptographic Validation - 15% 15% 39% 12% 20% 41
Emanation Security Analysis - 20% 37% 37% 3% 3% 35
Witnessed Test 3% 13% 48% 35% 3% - 40
Public Review - 14% 14% 38% 8% 27% 37
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cally significant difference (p<0.05) in perceptions of time
requirements between the Security Practitioner and Infor-
mation Security Manager roles.
Effectiveness: Table 5 displays respondent perceptions
of how effective the assurance techniques were “in achiev-
ing their objectives”. Out of the 20 assurance techniques,
11 received their highest frequency of respondents within
the “Good” rating of effectiveness. A further seven as-
surance techniques were predominantly rated as having a
“Fair” effectiveness. It is notable that many of these assur-
ance techniques were earlier rated with “Low” or “Medium”
answer confidence within Table 1. Only two assurance
techniques received more than 50% of their responses with
a combined rating of “Fair” and “Poor”: Review of Client-
Completed Self-Assessment Forms and Public Reviews. In
particular, it is striking that Review of Client-Completed
Self-Assessment Forms received a 31% “Poor” rating.
Table 5: Effectiveness of Assurance Techniques — P: Poor; F: Fair;
G: Good; VG: Very Good; E: Excellent
Assurance Technique
Effectiveness Total
P F G VG E Resp.
Review of [...] PPP 2% 27% 46% 19% 5% 93
[...] Self Assessment Form 31% 35% 29% 4% 2% 84
Architectural Review 1% 6% 46% 39% 8% 83
Configuration Review - 21% 41% 35% 3% 80
Source Code Review 7% 9% 49% 28% 7% 69
Observation 2% 39% 38% 18% 4% 56
Interview 7% 22% 36% 32% 3% 72
Red Team Exercises 5% 5% 27% 38% 26% 66
Penetration Tests - 5% 34% 47% 15% 88
Vulnerability Scan 6% 28% 37% 24% 5% 86
Social Engineering 5% 22% 45% 15% 14% 65
Threat Assessment - 19% 47% 29% 5% 73
Static Analysis 2% 41% 39% 18% - 44
Dynamic Analysis 2% 40% 36% 19% 2% 42
Fuzzing 5% 39% 32% 24% - 41
Formal Verification 3% 28% 40% 30% - 40
Cryptographic Validation - 20% 49% 24% 7% 41
Emanation Security Analysis 6% 40% 34% 20% - 35
Witnessed Test 10% 28% 45% 15% 3% 40
Public Review 16% 37% 26% 13% 8% 38
At the higher end of the scale, only Penetration Tests
and Red Team Exercises received their highest frequencies
above a “Good” rating, while also being the only assurance
techniques to receive greater than 50% of respondents for
a combined effectiveness of “Very Good” and “Excellent”.
Despite this, however, other assurance techniques contin-
ued to report respectable effectiveness ratings. In partic-
ular, Architectural Review, Configuration Review and In-
terview saw 30% or more respondents with a “Very Good”
effectiveness. Furthermore, Architectural Review received
a combined 47% “Very Good” and “Excellent” effective-
ness.
The role-based analysis identified two instances of sig-
nificant differences in stakeholder perceptions for two as-
surance techniques. First, a significant difference was iden-
tified for Social Engineering in the perceptions of Security
Practitioners (M=3.16, SD=1.06, N=56) and Information
Security Managers (M=2.43, SD=0.85, N=14); t(24) =
2.73, p = 0.011, two tailed. These results may reflect a
greater familiarity by Security Practitioners about the po-
tency of Social Engineering in simulated security assess-
ments where human behaviour is often seen as a weak link
in defensive operations. Such reasoning may explain the
higher mean effectiveness score for Security Practitioners.
Second, a significant difference was identified for Formal
Verification in the perceptions of Security Practitioners
(M=3, SD=0.88, N=32) and Information Security Man-
agers (M=3.57, SD=0.53, N=7); t(14) = -2.24, p = 0.042,
two tailed. Unlike Social Engineering, Formal Verification
is a largely theoretical exercise, which may have reflected
negatively in the perceptions of Security Practitioners, and
would explain the higher mean rating of Information Se-
curity Managers.
Table 6: Cost of Assurance Techniques — C: Cheap; M: Moderate;
E: Expensive; VE: Very Expensive; EE: Extremely Expensive
Assurance Technique
Cost Total
C M E VE EE Resp.
Review of [...] PPP 19% 68% 13% - - 93
[...] Self Assessment Form 65% 31% 4% - - 84
Architectural Review 11% 58% 28% 4% - 83
Configuration Review 11% 66% 21% 1% - 80
Source Code Review 4% 26% 36% 19% 14% 69
Observation 21% 64% 14% - - 56
Interview 18% 57% 22% 1% 1% 72
Red Team Exercises 3% 21% 50% 21% 5% 66
Penetration Tests 1% 43% 47% 8% 1% 88
Vulnerability Scan 52% 30% 15% 2% - 86
Social Engineering 15% 55% 28% 2% - 65
Threat Assessment 14% 55% 23% 8% - 73
Static Analysis 14% 64% 20% 2% - 44
Dynamic Analysis 10% 60% 29% 2% - 42
Fuzzing 10% 66% 17% 5% 2% 41
Formal Verification - 38% 23% 23% 18% 40
Cryptographic Validation 5% 27% 34% 24% 10% 41
Emanation Security Analysis 9% 43% 29% 17% 3% 35
Witnessed Test 13% 45% 33% 8% 3% 40
Public Review 42% 34% 16% 5% 3% 38
Cost: Perceptions of the costs for completing each as-
surance technique are shown in Table 6.
Three assurance techniques were considered predom-
inantly “Cheap”: Vulnerability Scan, Review of Client-
Completed Self-Assessment Forms and Public Review. The
Review of Client-Completed Self-Assessment Forms was
perceived to be the cheapest of all assurance techniques,
receiving a 65% “Cheap” rating along with a further 31%
as “Moderate”.
The majority of assurance techniques (13 of 20) re-
ceived the highest frequency of perceptions within the “Mod-
erate” cost category. Out of these 13, over 50% of respon-
dents rated “Moderate” costs for: Review of Documented
Policies, Procedures and Processes, Architectural Review,
Configuration Review, Observation, Interview, Social En-
gineering, Threat Assessment, Dynamic Analysis, Static
Analysis and Fuzzing.
More than 60% of respondents perceived the following
techniques to be “Expensive” or greater: Source Code Re-
view, Red Team Exercises, Formal Verification and Cryp-
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tographic Validation. Penetration Testing while receiving
a large proportion of respondents as “Expensive” (47%),
received few at the higher ratings (only 9%). A limited
number of assurance techniques received an “Extremely
Expensive” rating, although both Source Code Review and
Formal Verification are prominent with 14% and 18% re-
spectively.
No assurance techniques were found to have a statisti-
cally significant difference (p<0.05) in perceptions of cost
between the Security Practitioner and Information Secu-
rity Manager roles.
7.3. Cost-Effectiveness of Assurance Techniques
Based upon the findings for the perceptions of assur-
ance technique characteristics in Section 7.2, a measure of
cost-effectiveness was further derived. Cost-effectiveness
as defined within this study is a metric that considers the
relative cost and effectiveness of each assurance technique,
along with the confidence of respondent answers. Due to
the infrequent cases of statistical significance in percep-
tions in the role-based analysis, this section considers cost-
effectiveness purely from the holistic perspective of stake-
holders. As defined within Section 4, an assurance target
can constitute a security control or competence require-
ment. A separate approach is required for each. Here we
present that for measuring the cost-effectiveness of assur-
ance techniques that assess security controls. Computing
the cost-effectiveness metric requires a mapping between
the qualitative online survey criteria and a quantitative
value. The assignments used within this mapping are pre-
sented below:
Effectiveness Weighting =
{(Excellent = 1), (Very Good = 0.8),
(Good = 0.6), (Fair = 0.4), (Poor = 0.2)} (1)
Cost Weighting =
{(Extremely Expensive = 1), (Very Expensive = 0.8),
(Expensive = 0.6), (Moderate = 0.4), (Cheap = 0.2)} (2)
Using the mappings, the cost-effectiveness of each as-
surance technique can be calculated using the following
formula:
Cost-Effectiveness =
Overall Effectiveness× (1−Overall Cost) (3)
Within this formula, overall cost is subtracted from 1,
as it is considered to be inversely proportional to the over-
all effectiveness. Overall cost and overall effectiveness are
each the aggregate values of three sub-measures of cost
and effectiveness, where each measure represents all re-
spondent answers at one of the three confidence levels:
“High”, “Medium” and “Low”. For example, the effective-
ness rating of all respondents who reported “High” answer
confidence. Cost and effectiveness are therefore three el-
ement sets, which are aggregated to provide an “overall”
value. Within these formulae, we refer to a “Valid Pro-
portion” (VP). This consists of the frequency that a par-
ticular variable was chosen by survey respondents, relative
to the cumulative frequency of all answers, which excludes
missing cases (i.e., where respondents did not answer the
question). For example, how many respondents answered
“Excellent” effectiveness relative to the total number of
answers across “Excellent”, “Very Good”, “Good”, “Fair”
and “Poor”. VP is then represented within the range of
[0,1]. The formula can be expressed as:
V Pvalue =
Value Occurrences
Total Number of Values
, V P ∈ [0, 1]. (4)
The values at each confidence level are calculated as:
Cost{high,medium,low} = (1× V Pextremely expensive
+ 0.8× V Pvery expensive + 0.6× V Pexpensive
+ 0.4× V Pmoderate + 0.2× V Pcheap) (5)
Effectiveness{high,medium,low} = (1× V Pexcellent
+ 0.8× V Pvery good + 0.6× V Pgood
+ 0.4× V Pfair + 0.2× V Ppoor) (6)
Weightings of 0.6, 0.3 and 0.1 are then applied to the
confidence levels of “High”, “Medium” and “Low” respec-
tively to calculate the overall cost and overall effectiveness.
Overall Cost = (0.6× Costhigh + 0.3× Costmedium
+ 0.1× Costlow) (7)
Overall Effectiveness = (0.6× Effectivenesshigh + 0.3
× Effectivenessmedium + 0.1× Effectivenesslow) (8)
To determine the extent that confidence affects cost-
effectiveness, a separate analysis was conducted that does
not consider it. Therefore, a separate formula is required,
although this approach continues to use the same basic
components. The output of computing cost (5) and effec-
tiveness (6) are no longer three element sets that represent
each confidence level; instead, a singular level consisting
of responses from all confidence levels is used. As confi-
dence is not considered, the weighting added through (7)
and (8) is not required. Instead, the single element out-
puts of (5) and (6) are directly used as Overall Cost and
Overall Effectiveness respectively within (3).
The cost-effectiveness scores for each assurance tech-
nique using both the weighted and unweighted formulae is
shown in Figure 8.
Within the weighted analysis, the two least cost-effective
assurance techniques were found to be Formal Verification
and Cryptographic Analysis. Such positioning may be the
consequence of two factors. First, the extensive amount of
manual analysis used within such activities, which here re-
quires both a high level of expertise (see Table 3) and time
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Figure 8: Cost-Effectiveness of Individual Assurance Techniques
for assessment (see Table 4). Second, that the dominant
use case lies within niche environments or scope-restricted
scenarios. These factors can be further expanded to ex-
plain the low ranking of two further assurance techniques
for cost-effectiveness. In the case of Emanation Security
Analysis, the context of its use is significant, due to it being
primarily used within high security environments to assess
risks that are not considered in the majority of information
security scenarios. In contrast, Source Code Review has
wider application; however, time and competence require-
ments have both been perceived to be notably high. Such
characteristics are not the case for two of Source Code Re-
view’s optional contributing assurance techniques: Static
Analysis and Dynamic Analysis (see Figure 3). These as-
surance techniques involve large degrees of automation,
and are widely used in combination with Source Code Re-
view (notably Static Analysis as a first phase). Their con-
tributory nature and automation may explain their dis-
tinctly higher cost-effectiveness scores.
For the weighted analysis, the assurance technique that
was perceived to be most cost-effective was Public Review.
Such a finding may support the meteoric rise of crowd-
sourced bug bounty programs within recent years as an
affordable security assessment model. Vulnerability Scan
closely followed in second place. However, unlike Pub-
lic Review with moderate to high expertise requirements,
most respondents perceived Vulnerability Scan to require
only a Practitioner role (either alone or with supervision)
in 86% of cases (see Table 3) while requiring only one per-
son (see Table 2). Further highly cost-effective assurance
techniques were Architectural Review, Configuration Re-
view and Dynamic Analysis.
Despite subtle changes in cost-effectiveness scores, there
is consistency between the distributions of the weighted
and unweighted analyses. Such a finding suggests confi-
dence plays a limited role in determining rankings of cost-
effectiveness (i.e., those that are cost-effective and those
that are not remain largely consistent). Three exceptions
to this exist: Public Review, Dynamic Analysis and its op-
tional contributing assurance technique, Fuzzing. Of these
Public Review is the most striking having been the most
cost-effective in the weighted analysis, but was influenced
in the unweighted analysis by the large percentage of low
confidence answers (the highest across all assurance tech-
niques; see Table 1). Due to the consistency and the au-
thors’ belief that the confidence of respondents in their
perceptions should be considered, further analyses within
this paper will use the weighted analysis results.
7.4. Analysing Combinations of Assurance Techniques
Assurance techniques may be used in isolation, or com-
bined in an effort to establish greater synergy in the as-
sessment of security. Such synergy is dependent upon the
extent to which assurance techniques are complementary.
This section reports on the perceptions of respondents
about complementary assurance techniques, before assess-
ing their combined effectiveness and cost-effectiveness.
7.4.1. Establishing Complementary Assurance Techniques
For each assurance technique within the online sur-
vey, respondents were asked what they perceived to be
its first, second and third most complementary assurance
technique. Results were then analysed through the use of
stacked bar charts created for each assurance technique.









































Figure 9: Complementary Assurance Techniques for the Review of
Documented Policies, Procedures and Processes
The outcome of this analysis was twofold. First, it
enabled the identification of what were perceived to be
popular, complementary assurance techniques. Second, it
facilitated the grouping of assurance techniques that pro-
vide perceived synergistic outcomes.
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Table 7: Popular Complementary Assurance Techniques
Assurance Technique 1st 2nd 3rd Total
Review of [...] PPP 10 0 2 12
[...] Self Assessment Form 0 2 0 2
Architectural Review 2 1 1 4
Configuration Review 1 4 3 8
Source Code Review 0 2 3 5
Observation 0 4 5 9
Interview 2 6 3 11
Red Team Exercises 0 0 1 1
Penetration Tests 3 4 2 9
Vulnerability Scan 2 1 1 4
Social Engineering 0 0 1 1
Threat Assessment 0 0 1 1
Static Analysis 1 1 0 2
Dynamic Analysis 1 3 1 5
Fuzzing 0 1 1 2
Formal Verification 0 0 0 0
Cryptographic Validation 1 0 0 1
Emanation Security Analysis 0 0 0 0
Witnessed Test 0 0 0 0
Public Review 0 0 0 0
Most Commonly Chosen Techniques: Popularity here
is split between first, second, and third choice of perceived
complementary assurance technique. For each assurance
technique analysed, the most popular assurance technique
in the first, second, and third categories received an in-
crement in Table 7. For example, as shown in Figure 9,
for the Review of Documented Policies, Procedures and
Processes, Interview was perceived to be the highest first
choice complementary assurance technique, and was incre-
mented as such within the appropriate table column. The
process continued for second and third choice, and then
the remaining assurance techniques.
Table 7 shows a clear dominance of Review of Doc-
umented Policies, Procedures and Processes as the most
popular complementary assurance technique, not only in
terms of the cumulative frequency across the three cate-
gories, but also as the primary complementary assurance
technique. The second and third most frequently cho-
sen were Interview and Observe respectively. These three
techniques can be seen to be related, and are considered
the fundamental assurance techniques used within audit-
ing. Interestingly, the main proportion of their values lays
within the second and third choice complimentary cate-
gories, rather than the primary. In contrast, Penetration
Test ranked joint third in overall popularity, but saw its
values even distributed across the three categories. Con-
figuration Review also featured frequently, but again, was
predominantly considered a second or third choice com-
plimentary assurance technique. It is notable that these
five assurance techniques received high cost-effectiveness
scores within Section 7.3.
The assurance techniques that earlier received low con-
fidence ratings, also received low popular complimentary
values, with the exception of Dynamic Analysis. Arguably
this may be the result of respondents being unlikely to
recommend assurance techniques as complementary when
they lack confidence in their answers.
Combinations of Complementary Assurance Techniques:
Beyond understanding popularity, the perceptions of stake-
holders regarding complementary assurance techniques were
also used to establish complimentary combinations. The
intention being to determine combinations that can lead
to greater levels of effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. For
each assurance technique, the cumulative frequency (across
all three categories) to which the other 19 assurance tech-
niques were listed as complementary was reviewed. The
top three complementary assurance techniques were cho-
sen to create a combination of four. Duplicate combina-
tions were removed from the analysis, of which the authors
found five. The remaining 15 combinations can be seen in
Table 8. Each combination is assigned a numerical value
for reference purposes. An example of this process can be
seen by once again drawing on Figure 9. For the Review of
Documented Policies, Procedures and Processes the three
most popular complementary assurance techniques were
Interview, Observation and Review of Client-Completed
Self-Assessment Forms. In Table 8 this is represented as
Combination 1.
7.4.2. Effectiveness and Cost-Effectiveness for Combina-
tions of Complementary Assurance Techniques
Using the respondent-derived complementary-based com-
binations of assurance techniques, this section analyses the
resulting effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. Aggregation
through multiplication was the chosen approach for this
purpose, as it allows ease of analysis for uniformly sized
combinations.
The effectiveness of the 15 combinations is presented
within Figure 10a. The combination ranked most effec-
tive is “Comb. 8” (Red Team Exercise; Penetration Test;
Dynamic Analysis; Fuzzing), and is closely followed by
“Comb. 3” (Red Team Exercise; Penetration Test; Vulner-
ability Scan; Social Engineering. Both “Comb. 4” (Archi-
tectural Review; Configuration Review; Penetration Test;
Vulnerability Scan) and “Comb. 10” (Review of Docu-
mented Policies, Procedures and Processes; Architectural
Review; Configuration Review; Penetration Test) also re-
ceived amongst the highest effectiveness ratings.
Section 7.4.1 earlier highlighted the popularity of the
three main assurance techniques used within audits (Re-
view of Documented Policies, Procedures and Processes;
Interview; Observe). Despite this, of the two combinations
that included all three such assurance techniques, both
were determined as showing weak effectiveness. Further-
more, in both cases, the fourth assurance technique holds
close ties to the real-world audit process. For “Comb. 1”
this was the Review of Client-Completed Self-Assessment
Form which is often used in the preliminary phases of
an audit, or as a lightweight substitute for an audit; for
“Comb. 2” this was the Witnessed Test which is widely
used by industry regulators, and whose higher effectiveness
may be explained from this independence.
The cost-effectiveness of the 15 combinations is shown
in Figure 10b. A change in the distribution compared to
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Table 8: Numbered Combinations Defined Based on the Complementary Analysis
Assurance Technique
Combination
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Reviewing [...] PPP X X X X X X X X
[...] Self-Assessment Form X
Architectural Review X X X X X X
Configuration Review X X X
Source Code Review X X X X
Observation X X X X
Interview X X X
Red Team Exercises X X
Penetration Tests X X X X X X
Vulnerability Scans X X X
Social Engineering X X
Threat Assessment X X
Static Analysis X X X
Dynamic Analysis X X X X
Fuzzing X X X
Formal Verification X X
Cryptographic Validation X
Emanation Sec. Analysis X
Witnessed Test X
Public Review X


































Figure 10: Combined Assurance Techniques
the effectiveness analysis is immediately apparent.
The most cost-effective combinations were “Comb. 4”
(Architectural Review; Configuration Review; Penetration
Test; Vulnerability Scan) and “Comb. 10” (Review of Doc-
umented Policies, Procedures and Processes; Architectural
Review; Configuration Review; Penetration Test). Both
of which received amongst the highest effectiveness scores.
“Comb. 8” (Red Team Exercise; Penetration Test; Dy-
namic Analysis; Fuzzing) and “Comb. 3” (Red Team Ex-
ercise; Penetration Test; Vulnerability Scan; Social Engi-
neering) which ranked highest for effectiveness, were ranked
notably lower for cost-effectiveness (in particular for “Comb.
8”). Red Team Exercise is present in both combinations,
whose low cost-effectiveness adversely affects combination
performance. Despite this, it is notable that both of the
most effective and cost-effective combinations include the
alternative simulated security assessment assurance tech-
nique, Penetration Test. Furthermore, although the two
audit-focused combinations (“Comb. 1” and “Comb. 2”)
received the lowest effectiveness scores, their rankings im-
proved considerably for cost-effectiveness, which suggests
there is some merit in their use as the dominant method
for assessing conformance to assurance schemes.
The least cost-effective combinations were “Comb. 12”
(Review of Documented Policies, Procedures and Processes;
Architectural Review; Source Code Review; Formal Veri-
fication) and “Comb. 13” (Review of Documented Poli-
cies, Procedures and Processes; Penetration Test; Formal
Verification; Cryptographic Validation). Each ranked re-
spectably for effectiveness; however, they are the only com-
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binations that contain Formal Verification and Crypto-
graphic Validation which received the lowest individual
scores for cost-effectiveness.
8. Conclusion
The assurance technique is a fundamental component
of the assurance ecosystem; it is the mechanism by which
we assess security to derive a measure of assurance. De-
spite this importance, the characteristics of assurance tech-
niques have not been comprehensively explored within aca-
demic research. This paper addresses this gap through the
definition of 20 assurance techniques and their interdepen-
dencies, and a stakeholder survey to gather perceptions
of their characteristics. This survey received responses
from 153 industry practitioners, of which 81% had over
five years of experience.
With respect to assurance technique base character-
istics the survey collected perceptions across five major
areas, for a reference scenario of a “medium” sized target.
First, the number of people required to perform assurance
techniques, with respondents perceiving that 19 could be
completed by 1 or 2 people. Second, the expertise require-
ments, which found most assurance techniques required
Senior Consultants, although Practitioners would suffice if
given supervision. Third, the time required, which found
most assurance techniques could be completed within 2-10
days, although a fraction of respondents perceived some
assurance techniques required longer (e.g., Red Team Ex-
ercise and Cryptographic Validation). Fourth, their effec-
tiveness, with stakeholders perceiving Red Team Exercise
and Penetration Test as the most effective, and Review
of Client-Completed Self-Assessment Form as the least.
Fifth, the cost, where Review of Client-Completed Self-
Assessment Form and Vulnerability Scan were perceived
the cheapest, and Source Code Review, Red Team Exer-
cises, Formal Verification and Cryptographic Validation as
the most expensive. A role-based analysis was further con-
ducted to identify differences in perceptions between Se-
curity Practitioners and Information Security Managers.
Three cases of statistical significance were found: Wit-
nessed Test (people required), Formal Verification (effec-
tiveness), and Social Engineering (effectiveness).
These base characteristics were then used to derive a
measure of cost-effectiveness. This analysis saw Public Re-
view and Vulnerability Scan as the most cost-effective, and
Formal Verification and Cryptographic Validation as the
least.
Survey respondents were also asked what they per-
ceived to be the first, second, and third most complemen-
tary assurance technique, for each of the 20 defined assur-
ance techniques. This data was used to establish combina-
tions of complementary assurance techniques, which were
then analysed for their effectiveness and cost-effectiveness.
The findings determined that the most effective combi-
nation was “Comb. 8” (Red Team Exercise; Penetration
Test; Dynamic Analysis; Fuzzing), with “Comb. 4” (Ar-
chitectural Review; Configuration Review; Penetration Test;
Vulnerability Scan) as the most cost-effective.
Three limitations can be seen within the findings pre-
sented within this paper. First, the limited number in-
stances of statistical significance between the perceptions
of Security Practitioners and Information Security Man-
agers may potentially be a consequence of 15 stakeholders
reporting both roles (with role sample sizes as 124 and 33
respectively); in the wider population greater divergence in
perceptions may exist between those who clearly identify
as occupying a singular role. This hypothesis could not be
tested here due to the lack of a adequately sized dataset
if multi-role stakeholders were omitted. Second, percep-
tions by their very nature are subjective constructs and
their interpretation must be pursued with caution. How-
ever, the emphasis of this paper on the holistic perspec-
tive, which encompasses different groups of stakeholders
who may potentially differ in their perceptions, mitigates
this to some degree. Third, the qualitative labels used
within the ratings scales of the survey were chosen for
their relatable, and easily understood terminology; how-
ever, there are alternative approaches that in retrospect
may have been more appropriate to minimise the effect of
subjectivity (e.g., Likert Scales).
The findings presented within this paper are intended
to provide guidance for the cost-effective design and im-
plementation of security programmes and future assur-
ance schemes, along with establishing the foundations for
related research activity. Future work in this area will
follow three tracks. First, the assessment of respondent
perceptions for assurance techniques that can be used to
assess individual competencies for using other assurance
techniques (e.g., those used within qualification assess-
ments). Second, an analysis of how assurance techniques
are used to assess conformance to assurance schemes in
practice. The authors have already prepared a dataset for
this analysis. The framework for its creation along with
its results across 17 assurance schemes can be found in
a separate technical report [29]. Third, the application
of these assurance techniques to particular environments
(e.g., safety-critical such as Industrial Control Systems).
Future research should seek to complement the results ob-
tained in this paper through determining to what extent
expert perceptions may align with other more objective
approaches, such as those based on security metrics; how-
ever, this should be pursued with the caveat that these
security metrics are known not to render fully-accurate
results.
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